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Abstract 
 
In 2012, the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), an initiative launched by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) to promote regional integration and development between six 
mainland Southeast Asian countries, will reach its twentieth anniversary. Throughout the past 
twenty years, the GMS has been considered as highly successful, in comparison with other 
regional initiatives, in improving connectivity, competitiveness and development, with a 
particular emphasis on infrastructural development, which has facilitated trade between its 
member countries. Part of its success has been down to the capacity of the ADB and other 
external actors, such as Japan, in funding its projects. Therefore it has been the aim of this 
research to understand how and why Japan has funded these projects, and through using a 
multi-disciplinary framework, explore the various interests involved. 
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
Research Problem 
Regional integration has steadily progressed in Asia over recent decades, with the 
establishment of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and other institutions contributing to a burgeoning 
regional economic community. Since the end of the cold war, the inclusion of former 
socialist-bloc countries into this economic community has given Asian countries greater 
presence in the global arena and accelerated regional economic cooperation. However, within 
Asia a new form of informal integration, known as sub-regionalism, has become more 
prolific in recent years. This phenomenon is a move away from more traditional regionalism, 
experienced in Europe and North America, and within academia is still relatively 
underdeveloped. The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) initiative was launched by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992 in order to promote regional integration and 
development of the area through encouraging economic relations in nine different sectors, 
namely: transport infrastructure, agriculture, energy, environment, investment, human 
resource development, telecommunications, tourism, and transport and trade facilitation. 
Prior to its establishment most countries within the region, with the exception of Thailand, 
remained fairly closed to the world markets, as a result of state-led economic planning and 
decades of inner conflict, which consequently led to low levels of economic development. 
Nevertheless, since its foundation, the GMS programme has implemented several projects 
across the region, which has had a direct impact on the regional integration of its member 
countries. As the GMS agenda is focussed on market-based integration, where the emphasis 
is to provide transnational public goods rather than the establishment of institutional 
agreements and frameworks, its main focus has been the provision of cross-border 
infrastructure. These cross-border infrastructure projects have been instrumental in 
establishing successful regional integration and have set the GMS apart from other 
institutions in the region. A major advantage of the GMS, over other institutions such as 
ASEAN,  is the capacity for funding such projects, and along with the ADB, several external 
actors and institutions have contributed funds to their projects in the region. One of the most 
significant financers of GMS projects has been Japan, as it has recognised the need for the 
Mekong Basin area’s development as an essential element of future East Asian regional 
integration. 
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Aims/Objectives of the research 
The purpose of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of regional 
integration in developing countries by assessing the factors which have driven the 
development of the GMS programme. In addition to this, the potential role of external states 
in the development of regional integration will be explored by analysing the unique 
relationship between Japan and the countries involved in the GMS. It is hoped that by first 
highlighting the economic relationships and trends between Japan and the GMS countries, 
followed by a closer inspection of Japanese interests in Vietnam, the driving forces 
underpinning the GMS can be better understood. 
Previous research 
 The political economy of the Mekong Basin countries has received attention from 
many scholars, over the last few decades, with numerous studies being conducted on the 
processes of regional integration. However, commonly within this field studies are rooted in a 
single discipline, such as economics/economic geography or in international relations theory. 
In addition to this, the majority of studies with a specific focus on the GMS are produced by 
the ADB, through either working papers or collected in the Journal of GMS Development 
Studies (2004-2008). These studies have provided a valuable contribution to a better 
understanding of the various impacts of infrastructure and other cooperative projects on the 
regional integration process and their consequences for socio-economic development 
(Fujimura & Edmond 2008, Strutt & Lim 2005, Bafoil & Lin 2010, Menon 2005).  
It is also beneficial to consider research which frames the GMS within wider debates 
on regionalism and regional integration in South East Asia. In contrast to the literature 
previously discussed, this research tends to be more multi-disciplinary due to the nature of 
regionalism as a multi-faceted process drawing on different academic fields. The description 
and conceptualisation of external actors within regionalism research is relatively 
underdeveloped, which Hettne (2005) notes ‘is somewhat surprising, given the considerable 
attention which external actors [...] receive in the study of national and local transformation 
processes’ (2006:555). In understanding the driving forces behind the GMS, it is essential 
that this gap in contemporary debate on regionalism is addressed considering the GMS is ‘a 
programme launched ‘from above’ by an external actor […] unlike ASEAN, which is a result 
of endogenous forces, that is, efforts by individual states acting as a group’ (Lindberg 
2007:186).  
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Preliminary Findings & Research Questions 
In assessing previous research, the following preliminary findings concerning the 
research problem have been found and will form the basis of the research questions: 
• The GMS has been considered as advantageous over other regional groupings in 
South East Asia due to its structure and capacity to fund projects 
• Japan has played a key role, both through Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
and in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank, in funding projects 
undertaken in the GMS 
• Infrastructural development has been a core component in the integration projects 
funded by Japan within the GMS 
• Since the establishment of the GMS, there has been a shift in Japanese interests, both 
economically and strategically, from Thailand to Vietnam 
Research Question: How and why have Japan interests been a driving force in supporting 
regional integration projects undertaken by the Greater Mekong Sub-region programme?  
Sub Questions: 
‐ To what extent can the GMS be considered as advantageous compared to other 
regional integration projects?  
‐ What is the relationship between Japanese ODA and trade with the economies of 
the Greater Mekong Sub-region?  
‐ Why has there been a shift in interests from Thailand to Vietnam? How has this 
impacted on regional integration in the GMS? 
Disposition of the thesis 
The remainder of this research will be structured into six chapters. Firstly the 
methodological considerations of the research will be outlined in the next chapter. The 
following two chapters will deal specifically with the theoretical and contextual frameworks 
used in the thesis, elaborating on the theoretical perspectives from economics, international 
relations and international political economy as well as the historical context of regionalism 
in the area and Japan’s role as an aid donor. As this research is using a mixed methods 
approach the analysis chapters will be split into two parts, namely a quantitative analysis and 
a qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis will make use of descriptive statistics to 
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highlight the relationships between Japan and the GMS countries and aims to emphasize the 
significance of Vietnam as an aid recipient and trade partner. The economic theoretical 
perspectives outlined in the prior chapters will serve to underpin this quantitative analysis. 
The following qualitative analysis will explore this relationship between Japan and Vietnam, 
highlighted in the quantitative analysis, by providing a more in-depth discussion on how this 
relationship has evolved and how integration projects are being facilitated in Vietnam with 
the help of Japan. Finally a conclusive chapter will attempt to evaluate how an external actor 
can influence regional integration and how the relationship between Vietnam and Japan has 
impacted upon the integration projects undertaken by the GMS.   
CHAPTER 2 - Methodology 
Design of Study 
The point of departure for this research is in considering the fact that a concept such 
as regionalism is a multi-disciplinary phenomenon, which can be approached from various 
different methodological frameworks. Most research rooted in economic theory tends to 
make use of quantitative data to highlight and explore relationships between variables, 
whereas IR/IPE tends to make more use of qualitative data. Therefore, for this research 
design, it is essential that a mixed methods approach is used to encapsulate all the theoretical 
perspectives underpinning the research problem. A multi-strategy research ‘may provide a 
better understanding of a phenomenon than if just one method had been used’ and in addition 
to using quantitative data in order to explain the variables in a relationship, qualitative 
research may be useful to facilitate the interpretation of the relationship between quantitative 
variables (Bryman 2001:460-464). 
As the objective of this research is to discover both how and why Japan has been a 
significant actor in the construction and development of the GMS, the research design must 
be both descriptive and exploratory in nature. A solid exploration of why Japan has been 
significant in the GMS must be underpinned by a comprehensive description of how it has 
interacted with the region. Therefore, the first section of the thesis investigates the 
relationship between Japan and the GMS economies using quantitative methodology, aiming 
to describe and analyse the patterns and trends from the empirical data sourced. The use of 
descriptive statistics and secondary data analysis should complement the contextual 
framework in providing a comprehensive description of the situation. The second section of 
the thesis draws upon conclusions made in the first section by examining the specific factors 
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affecting the relationship between Japan and Vietnam and how their relationship will affect 
regional integration projects. This exploratory section of the research will therefore use a 
more qualitative approach. Through using a multi-disciplinary framework, this research 
allows for both methodological and theoretical triangulation, which is defined as ‘a research 
strategy that involves using several methods to reveal multiple aspects of a single empirical 
reality’ (Miller & Fox 2010:35). Methodologically this is achieved through employing both 
qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as a varied selection of data. Theoretically, 
triangulation is also achieved by using IR/IPE and economic theories. A more in-depth 
discussion of these theoretical perspectives can be found in the following chapter. 
Data sources and Methods 
As previously mentioned, the data used in this research consists of a combination of 
both qualitative and quantitative data, which will entail using both primary and secondary 
data. The quantitative data in the research involves extensive quantitative data collection on 
trade, official development assistance and funding within the GMS from Japan. Data will be 
collated from a variety of international online databases, such as UNCOMTRADE, OECD 
and the IMF statistics websites, and also from previous research and specialist archives, such 
as the JETRO library in Hanoi. In order to process this data and present findings for analysis, 
statistical software packages such as Microsoft Excel and SPSS 20 will be used. Microsoft 
Excel will mainly be used to create graphical representations of selected data, to highlight 
trends and patterns between different variables and help describe the relationship between 
Japan and the GMS. In order to build upon these descriptive statistics, SPSS will be used to 
construct correlation matrices for each country pairing investigated in the research. 
Correlations are a useful form of analysis for exploratory research as they are able to indicate 
both the strength and the direction of the relationship between a set of variables (Bryman & 
Cramer 2001:169). As it is the strength and direction of the relationship between aid and 
trade flows which is of interest, correlations may be a more suitable form of analysis for this 
research, than other statistical tests such as regressions or causality tests.  
Data will be gathered from 1992 until the present day, in order to examine the 
relationships since the establishment of the GMS. The data collection will involve 4 of the 
GMS countries, namely Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia & Vietnam and by limiting the scope 
of the research to a small number of countries within the Mekong Basin, it allows for an in-
depth understanding of each case, but by choosing four cases that show different perspectives, 
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it is hoped that the generalizations may be drawn.  The experiences of each country can help 
to identify and explain the research problem presented since the countries chosen will allow 
for purposeful maximal sampling, as although they share many common factors, each country 
is at different levels of regional integration and therefore can be used to highlight different 
perspectives (Creswell 2007:75). Within the research Myanmar and China will be excluded 
from the analysis as data for several reasons. For Myanmar, the availability of trade and aid 
statistics are extremely low, and it is assumed that the political regime in the country, and 
subsequent trade embargo will mean that any the ability to look at the relationship between 
aid and trade will be skewed. China will also be excluded from the analysis as only two 
provinces of the country are members of the GMS and, again, trade and aid data for specific 
provinces is also difficult to obtain. The historical relationship between China and Japan is 
also likely to heavily influence their economic relationship. Data from other countries, such 
as other major donors and geographical neighbours will be used occasionally to contextualize 
the data gathered in the GMS and highlight some significant factors. For example, in order to 
incorporate the neo-realist theory, data on small donor countries will also be collected, as it 
should serve as a good proxy for the need and perceived effectiveness of aid within each 
recipient country. 
The qualitative data consists of a series of semi-structured interviews and e-interviews, 
conducted during a 3 week fieldwork period in Hanoi, Vietnam. The interviews have been 
conducted with various representatives in different positions at research institutes, ministries, 
universities and domestic/regional organisations. The informants involved were varied in that 
some provided a good overview of the issues relating to the research problem whereas others 
had very specific knowledge of certain aspects of the research. Therefore, there was a need to 
conducted semi-structured interviews as this technique can allow the researcher to ensure that 
the issues they find significant are covered, but also provide the informants with opportunities 
to bring up their own ideas and opinions (Willis 2006:145) . The geographical scope of the 
thesis has meant that it was difficult to meet some informants face-to-face and instead an e-
interview was used. Although e-interview has been criticized as there is a lack of tacit signs 
and spontaneous responses due to the physical separation between the interviewer and the 
interviewee, it has the advantages of asynchronicity as it ‘enables interviewees to reflect and 
then supply a considered reply’ as well as breaking down the geographical, financial and time 
constraints involved with face-to-face interviews (Bampton & Cowton 2002).  
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The selection of the interviewees was decided using a snowball effect, which is a 
form of convenience sampling whereby the researcher establishes a small group of contacts 
on the research topic and then uses these links to secure other contacts (Bryman 2001:100). In 
addition to this, researchers from IPSARD were very helpful in providing contact information 
for further informants. Apart from the data collected from the interviews, previous literary 
studies, official documents, articles, newspapers and declarations and statements by key 
actors have also contributed greatly to the qualitative data in this research. The qualitative 
data has therefore been used to complement the trends and relationships highlighted by the 
quantitative data collected and helps to further explain the factors involved in these 
relationships. 
Limitations of sources 
Through using a mixed methods approach it is hoped that some of the limitations 
associated with both qualitative and quantitative methods can be minimized. Nevertheless, 
there are still a few limitations with the sources of data that should be mentioned at the outset 
of this research. One issue which is continually present in any research focussed on Lao PDR, 
Cambodia and to some extent Vietnam is the question of reliability and validity of data 
sources. The majority of statistics have been obtained from large international databases, such 
as the UN, IMF and the OECD. This has been due to the lack of reliable data reporting from 
domestic statistics agencies and gaps in the data from the earlier years included in this study. 
With aid, trade and investment flows, the data has often come from the donor countries, such 
as Japan. However, where possible the author has tried to cross-check this data with official 
statistics from national authorities.  
Another limitation of the data sources considers the issues involved with relying on 
interviews as a source of data. When interviewing representatives from large organisations on 
macro issues, such as this research problem, the author must make the assumption that 
opinions given by interviewees correlate with the institution they work for. In addition to this 
the sampling method of snowballing to secure interviews has its disadvantages as it does not 
provide a truly random sample and ‘it is very unlikely that the sample will be representative 
of the population’ (Bryman 2001: 102). However, by not relying on either secondary 
statistical analysis or interview sources solely to address the research questions, it is hoped 
that the limitations outlined here can be reduced. 
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Ethical Considerations 
Although the content of this research is not generally considered a sensitive subject, 
relative to other issues such as human rights or household level studies, it is important to 
consider the ethical implications of this research. Firstly, the author’s role as an etic 
researcher, whereby the research is conducted by an outsider to the geographical location of 
study, calls for cultural sensitivity and the need to make every effort to be as objective as 
possible. Secondly the ethical considerations involved with conducting interviews must be 
outlined as the author has strived to conduct this research in accordance with the ethical 
guidelines as described by the Swedish Research Council. All informants were briefed on the 
nature of the research, asked permission to use any of the information provided as data within 
the research, and informed on how their information would contribute to the research. 
CHAPTER 3 - Theoretical Framework 
Regionalism, as an academic concept, is a complex and much contested topic and 
different disciplines, such as International Relations, International Economics and 
International Political Economy, have all attempted to define and understand this phenomena. 
However, due to differences in ontological standpoints, this has often resulted in differing 
opinions and outcomes. A comprehensive definition of regionalism could then be given as 
‘the structures, processes and arrangements that are working towards greater coherence 
within a specific international region in terms of economic, political, security, socio-cultural 
and other kinds of linkages’ (Dent 2008:7). Therefore, when considering a suitable theoretical 
framework to understand the processes of regionalism in the Greater Mekong Sub-region, it 
seems that a multi-disciplinary approach offers a viable solution to this problem. By 
considering different theoretical perspectives from different disciplines that have tried to 
explain regionalism, it is hoped that the motivations behind states involved in such processes 
will be better understood. Therefore, this research will utilise theoretical perspectives on 
developmental regionalism, neo-realism and aid for trade theories, from the fields of IPE, 
International Relations and Economics respectively. 
Firstly, the concept of integration itself needs to be addressed, as it is central to 
debates on regionalism. Some scholars argue that the term ‘regional integration’ is a dubious 
and confusing term as it can refer to economic, political and/or social elements of integration, 
which can each be broken down further into sub-categories (Nye 1971, Hettne 2005). It is 
therefore argued that ‘regional cooperation’ is a more appropriate terminology. However, 
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others have argued that a clear distinction between cooperation and integration exists, 
whereby cooperation can be seen as agreements and policies to increase connectivity between 
countries, which are often qualitative in nature, whereas integration can be used to describe 
the physical removal of trade barriers and other quantifiable actions designed to facilitate 
interdependence (Balassa 1961). Within the context of this research, the term ‘regional 
integration’ will be used to denote the trade-related aspects of economic integration, whether 
through the provision of physical infrastructure or through policies aimed at trade 
liberalisation.  
Theories on regionalism, within the discipline of International Political Economy, 
have gone through a process of rapid change and in order to understand how contemporary 
theoretical perspectives can contribute to a better understanding of regional integration in the 
GMS, it is important to first briefly outline the development of regionalism as an academic 
field. Classical regionalism theories, or ‘old’ regionalism, arose during the 1950s and 1960s, 
with its roots based on the European experience of integration, under the European Union. 
Scholars such as Viner (1950), Balassa (1961) and Lipsey (1970) focussed on how the 
processes of regionalism can progress in a linear fashion from trade liberalisation and free 
trade agreements, through common markets to monetary and economic unions (Dent 2008:9). 
Commonly, classical theories were focussed mainly on the economic dimensions of 
regionalism, and rarely incorporated perspectives from other academic disciplines. 
Nevertheless, due to significant changes in the international system at the end of the Cold 
War, the relevance of classical regionalism theories became less applicable as different forms 
of regionalism developed across the world, which contrasted sharply with the European 
experience. In the last two decades classical regionalism theories have gradually been 
replaced by new regionalism theories, which have attempted to expand ideas on regionalism, 
by incorporating social and political factors, in addition to the economic dimensions of 
integration. This move towards a multi-disciplinary approach to regionalism has allowed for 
a better understanding of the processes involved and has moved away from the narrow and 
limited economistic approach of classical regionalism (Mansfield & Milner 1999:621). 
Although the distinction between old and new regionalism has been disputed as 
archaic, on the grounds that new regionalism has been around for over two decades (Hettne 
2005), it is important to understand that a multitude of alternative forms of regional 
integration, exemplified in this research by the GMS, is now offering a variety of 
opportunities to other less developed countries pursuing different forms of regionalism. 
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Developmental regionalism can be defined as ‘a development capacity-building process 
targeted at periphery states to help them engage in regional economic processes and draw 
them closer into the core economic zones of the region’ (Dent & Richter 2011:34). This 
definition would seem to fit with the GMS, as well as other sub-regionalism initiatives 
supported by the Asian Development Bank such as Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-
Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) or the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand 
Growth Triangle (IMT-GT). The opportunities for the countries involved to reap the benefits 
of economies of scale from integration, as well as the capacity to close the development gap 
between rich and poor areas of South East Asia, makes this form of regionalism desirable to 
most states. In addition, the objectives of development regionalism for ‘growth polygons’, 
such as the GMS, seem to be congruent and even complementary with macro-regional 
initiatives like the goals of the ASEAN economic community. The interests of external actors 
in this form of regional integration can also be explained as this development capacity-
building process seems ‘conducive to the operation of more efficient internationalized and 
transnationalized business activities’ (Dent & Richter 2011:35).  
 As previously stated, the theoretical framework for this research will encompass more 
than just regionalism theory, in order to try and provide a deeper understanding of the unique 
form of regionalism presented in the GMS. If regionalism is conceived as relating to ‘a 
situation where there exists a clear idea of a region [and] a set of goals and values associated 
with a specific project that an identifiable group of actors wish to realize’ (Hveem 2003:83), 
then theoretical perspectives rooted in International relations may also be helpful in analysing 
the interests and motivations of actors involved in the GMS. For this research, the opposing 
paradigms of neo-realism and neo-liberalism will be considered behind Japanese interests in 
the GMS and subsequently how these interests affect the actions of the member states. Within 
a neo-liberal perspective, ‘while acknowledging that aid motives are normally mixed, [they] 
insist that moral factors have been decisive in the long run: for the origin, sustainability, and 
development of aid as a regime’ (Kamminga 2007). Whereas neo-realism would stress the 
economic and security interests of donor countries as the over-riding factor involved in aid 
allocation. Considering Japan’s position within the global economy as a resource-poor 
country, the provision of infrastructure for the GMS as a means of reducing Japanese trade 
costs and creating access to new markets for Japanese exports would seem to fit more with a 
neo-realist perspective on aid allocation. However, this view of aid allocation as a means of 
maximising national security interests appears limited in fully explaining Japan’s interests in 
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the GMS and would view the member states of the GMS as fairly passive in this process. 
Therefore, Kamminga’s (2007) suggestion of a ‘mixed neorealist theory that assigns clear 
priority to national security because of non-transformed system constraints yet also expects 
states, if once secure, to show altruistic instead of further egoistic behaviour, depending on 
the nature and development of their domestic moral-political systems’ seems a more helpful 
theoretical framework for analysing the interests of both Japan and the GMS member states. 
Finally it is important to consider some theoretical perspectives within economics, as 
the main units of analysis will be related to aid and trade flows from Japan to the GMS. 
These theories offer some insight on the motivations behind regional integration, from an 
economic perspective, as well as illustrate the ideology behind ‘top down’ developmental 
regionalism. Central to the research problem is the question ‘why do countries give aid?’ and 
therefore, theories on foreign aid motivations and aid effectiveness will make up the final 
theoretical perspective. Within economic discourse, foreign aid has been seen as an essential 
component of growth, progress and prosperity for developing countries and has been used by 
donor countries in a variety of ways to help close the gap between the rich and the poor of the 
world. Nevertheless the continual shifts in theoretical explanations of development 
throughout the past fifty years have emphasized the need to continually re-evaluate the nature 
of aid in order to maintain its relevance and effectiveness. If development can be seen as 
implying ‘intentional social change in accordance with explicit societal objectives’ then these 
objectives must be mirrored by aid policies at the time (Hettne 2009:9). The role of external 
actors, and especially developed countries, in the developing world has been significant since 
the days of colonialism and their actions and motivations have continued to influence the 
development of these areas. In the modern age the presence of external actors in the 
developing world is most commonly associated with the idea of facilitating development 
through foreign aid. Aid was used as a development tool as ‘it was thought that infusions of 
foreign capital, in the form of loans and foreign aid as well as knowledge and technology 
from the industrialised ‘centre’ would bridge the global divide’ (Coronel & Dixit 2006:19). 
The majority of foreign aid often comes in the form of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) which is provided by the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
a forum set up by the Organization of economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
1960 to discuss issues regarding aid. The forum defines ODA as ‘resources transferred on 
concessional terms with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of the 
developing countries as the main objective’ (Burnell 2002: 473). With the exception of Japan, 
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the rest of the DAC members were predominantly from either Western Europe or North 
America and around a third of global ODA is managed and allocated by large multilateral 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Many dependency scholars 
critiqued the effectiveness of ODA as a tool for creating sustainable development, believing 
instead that aid was used as ‘an instrument of domination and exploitation’ and that it only 
‘benefitted privileged elites in the South as well as in donor countries’ (Burnell 2002:475). In 
spite of the dependency critique being undermined in recent years by the post-development 
movement it is important to note that ‘even though some ODA appears altruistic, much is 
manifestly deployed to promote the political and economic concerns of donors’ (Desai & 
Potter 2002:471). Although these concerns have shifted throughout time, they still remain an 
essential component in aid allocation, whether explicitly stated as a condition for aid or 
indirectly providing benefits for donor countries. One of the most significant indicators of the 
economic concerns of donor countries is foreign trade statistics and therefore one economic 
assumption at the core of this research is that trade between countries is dependent upon the 
aid allocation from one country to another. Many scholars have investigated the bilateral 
relationship between aid and trade, in the hope of establishing the casual link between the two. 
Osei (2004) states that aid can determine trade as ‘this can happen directly, when the aid is 
tied (to imports from the donor), or indirectly, if the aid contributes to growth and an increase 
in the demand for imports from the donor’ (2004:356). In addition to this, Johansson & 
Pettersson (2009) suggest that while many studies have shown that a positive correlation 
exists between donor aid and donor exports, a positive correlation also exists between donor 
aid and donor imports. They conclude ‘that an intensified aid relation is associated with a reduction in the effective cost of geographic distance which implies larger bilateral trade’ (Johansson & Pettersson 2009:2).  As Japan remains one of the world’s largest aid 
donors, and much of that aid is directed towards South-East Asia, these theories serve as a 
good starting-point in understanding Japan’s role in the GMS. 
Historically, the motivations of donor countries have been associated with concepts 
related to security, in that poverty reduction is key to establishing global security and reduces 
threats to developed nation states. This rhetoric was especially dominant during the formation 
of DAC, within the context of the Cold War and the threat of communism. However, the end 
of the Cold War has led to a shift in the notions of security, from state security to human 
security and ‘one can see this contemporary focus on ‘human’ as part of the paradigm shift 
which goes together with globalization in giving rise to a post-national logic’ (Hettne 
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2009:22). In light of this shift, issues such as poverty reduction, good governance, human 
rights promotion and ecological security have become integral factors for donor countries 
motivations in aid allocation, along with their own national interests.  
Figure 3.1 – Tensions between the motivations of donor countries 
 
 
Source: Wolcott & Haddad (2011:83) 
In analysing the effectiveness or relevance of ODA it is important to understand the 
motivations of aid donors. In the figure above Wolcott & Haddad (2011) have developed a 
diagram to summarize the different objectives of donor countries in respect to ODA. It is 
argued that there exists the ‘need to align the three potentially conflicting goals of aid donors: 
peace (i.e. conflict prevention, peace-building); planet (i.e. sustainable management of global 
resources) and prosperity (MDGs, growth, poverty and inequality reduction and wellbeing)’ 
(2011:82). In this respect the ultimate goal is to reach number 7 on the diagram, whereby 
ODA is used in a way that reduces poverty, creates sustainable development and meets the 
needs of both donors and recipients. 
Figure 3.2 - Research Framework – Deductive Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
Theory 2 
The GMS as ‘top-down’ 
development regionalism 
Theory 3 
States assign a clear priority to 
national interests in donating 
aid 
My Framework 
Japanese interests and 
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driving force in the 
construction and 
development of the GMS 
Theory 1 
Trade is dependent on aid 
Methodology 
Quantitative:  
Descriptive Statistics  
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Qualitative: Case Study  
Japan-Vietnam 
relationship 
Hypothesis GMS countries, in 
which Japan has donated more aid, 
will also have higher trade volumes 
with Japan 
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Contextual Framework 
 The theoretical framework can be summarized using the diagram above. By 
combining the theoretical perspectives from three different academic disciplines, it is hoped 
that Japanese interests and motivations in the GMS can be explored. Before analysing the 
quantitative and qualitative data collected, the next section will give a brief overview of the 
GMS within a regional context, as well as a brief outline of Japan’s history as an aid donor.   
CHAPTER 4 - Contextual Framework 
The GMS in a Regional Context  
Started in 1992, the GMS is often regarded as a pragmatic, results-oriented and 
flexible form of developmental regionalism, which promotes cooperation and integration 
between its members that complements both national and international development 
strategies. The major priority of the GMS is in the development of several economic 
corridors, which are used to promote its objectives in facilitating the transnational movement 
of goods and people and enhancing prosperity across the region. The map below outlines the 
location of these economic corridors: 
Figure 4.1 – Economic Corridors within the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
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Source: Asian Development Bank (www.adb.org/gms) 
‘A corridor is a geographical zone in which infrastructure improvements are linked to 
production, trade and related aspects of economic life, in order to promote economic 
development and cooperation among regions or border countries’ (Faure & Schwab 
2008:112). This commitment to the provision of physical infrastructure as a means of 
regional integration, over more political or institutional integration, has meant that the GMS 
represents a more ‘market led’ form of regionalism, which appeals to both the private and 
public sectors. Vice President of the ADB, Bindu Lohani, argues that by using economic 
corridors as the cornerstone of its regional integration they ‘not only have the potential to 
serve as models for other regional cooperation initiatives elsewhere; they are also already 
emerging as building blocks of regional connectivity and integration in Southeast Asia’1. 
The rise of new regionalism after the Cold War has meant that there exists a multitude 
regional groupings dealing with the issues of regionalism in South East Asia, and the Mekong 
economies participate, not only in the GMS but also, in different regional groups dealing with 
various aspects of integration and working at different geo-spatial levels. The various aspects 
of integration can roughly be classified into hard and soft integration whereby hard 
integration deals with the provision of physical infrastructure or specific action towards trade 
liberalisation, such as the reduction of tariffs, whereas soft integration is more concerned with 
improving areas which help facilitate trade indirectly, such as human resource development. 
The figure below highlights some of the most significant regional groupings for South East 
Asian economies and the areas of integration which they are focussed on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 http://www.adb.org/news/cambodia/economic-corridors-development-measure-success-gms-
program?ref=countries/gms/news 
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Figure 4.2 – Categorisation of selected supranational institutions and schemes based on type 
of integration and geographical level 
 
Source: Lindberg (2007) 
ASEAN, which was established in 1967 between six South East Asian countries and 
expanded throughout the 1990s to include Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam and Myanmar, is 
often regarded as the most comprehensive regional institution in South East Asia, which 
promotes a wide range of both hard and soft integration projects across the entire region. 
ASEAN are committed to bridging the development gap between these Mekong economies 
and its core members, which is encapsulated by the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), 
which aims at improving economic integration among its new members. Bridging this 
development gap is seen as a top priority for ASEAN as it underpins the development of 
larger objectives, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and facilitating the creation 
of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which aims to establish a single market across 
South East Asia by 2015. Smaller regional groupings are often seen to complement ASEAN 
objectives and in this respect, ‘the GMS program is assisting its members to integrate more 
closely with the ASEAN region and, through this, with the rest of the world (Menon 2005:32).  
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The other significant group working with the economic integration of Mekong 
economies is the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy 
(ACMECS) which was set up in 2003 by Thailand, who aimed to tackle the development 
differences between itself and its neighbours by cooperation in increasing competitiveness, 
agricultural and manufacturing development, creating employment opportunities and 
enhancing peace and prosperity in the region. According to the ACMECS website, ‘it is in 
this way that the new cooperation framework will act as a building block and move ASEAN 
forward at a more even pace, on the basis of self-reliance and shared prosperity’2. 
Despite the various ways in which each of these regional groupings can complement 
each other in advancing regional integration, the GMS has some advantages over these other 
regional groups which have contributed to its success as well as improved its status among 
member governments and external actors as an integral player in each countries integration 
strategies. 
 Perhaps the greatest advantage of the GMS over other regional groups, such as 
ASEAN or ACMECS, is its financial resources and abilities to secure large amounts of 
funding for its projects. The nature of the GMS as a regional group established by an external 
actor, which is focussed on the provision of transnational public goods, means that there are 
benefits not only for member states but for the global business community as well. This has 
helped the GMS secure funding as, in respect to regionalism, ‘all programmes, projects, 
arrangements need outside funding and the funds will come if the activities are attractive to 
invest in’ (Sucharithanarugse 2006:293). By attracting the attention of the two largest 
economies in East Asia, namely Japan and China, the GMS has been able to secure funding 
for projects, where ASEAN initiatives such as the IAI, have fallen short. For the GMS ‘more 
resources are available, hence creating a greater readiness in member countries to be involved 
in various projects’ and ‘the funds available within the IAI are clearly very moderate and 
stand in sharp contrast with the affluent ADB funds’ (Lindberg 2007:194). For the ACMECS, 
the exclusion of China as a member may be seen as a contributing factor to their lack of funds 
in relation to the GMS. In addition to this, as ACMECS is a Thai initiative, the majority of its 
funding comes from Thailand, which considering the country is one of the major contributors 
to the IAI suggests that the ACMECS may not complement ASEAN as it could detract funds 
from the IAI.  
                                                
2 http://www.acmecs.org/index.php?id=9 
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The ‘market-led’ form of regional integration, pursued by the GMS, can be seen to fit 
with Higgott’s (1997) ideas of de facto structural economic regionalism rather than the de 
jure institutional economic cooperation pursued by ASEAN and the EU. De facto structural 
economic regionalisation is seen ‘as the outcome of a dynamic tension between globalisation 
and regionalisation, driven by growing intra-regional trade and FDI rather than by 
governments’ (Lindberg 2007:70). Considering the political tensions between the members of 
the GMS, such as issues with human rights in Myanmar, territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea and the recent conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, as well as the historical 
legacy of conflict in the region, it appears that by focussing regionalism on markets rather 
than political issues has given the GMS an advantage over other regional groupings.    
Japan as a leading donor 
In order to fully understand Japan’s aid policies, with respect to the GMS, it is 
important to discuss how different discourses in development have changed over time and 
had a significant influence on global aid diplomacy. After the Second World War, when 
development first began to get global attention, the meta-narrative of modernization theory 
was used as the basis for most development programmes. During this period, Japan was 
quickly establishing itself as one of the world’s leading aid donors and soon surpassed most 
major aid donating countries in total ODA contributions. In addition to this, the era was also 
marked by substantial increases in economic growth across other parts of Asia, later to be 
coined the East Asian Miracle (World Bank 1993), whereby the successes of modernization 
theories and Japan’s flying geese model were often seen as a good explanation. The flying 
geese model, developed by Akamatsu as early as the 1930s, referred to the ‘dynamic shift of 
industry from one country to another’ and ‘the model can apply to groups of Japanese firms 
moving their productive capacity in stages through the countries of Asia’ (Gwynne 2002:202). 
It made use of both the idea of industrialization as core to growth, and therefore development, 
as well as the ‘trickle-down’ effect of technology and expertise, which were central to 
modernization theories at the time.  
Japan’s interest in developing Asia, and especially within South-East Asia, was 
confirmed by the Fukuda doctrine in 1977, stating its desire to create regional stability in 
South-East Asia and would encourage cooperation and integration within the region, without 
exerting force or becoming a superpower.  The doctrine was also ‘accompanied by a 
generous cheque of $1.55 billion for all countries of the region’ (Faure & Schwab 2008: 53). 
19 
 
Although the doctrine did not specifically emphasise development objectives for South-East 
Asia, its stress on regional stability and integration could be seen as directly related to Japan’s 
desire to maximise economic opportunities in the region. The focus on regional integration in 
the Fukuda doctrine could therefore be seen as laying the foundations for future aid 
programmes in the region, such as the GMS. In this respect some scholars argue that as a 
result of the country ‘lacking political-military power, Japan has often opted to employ 
foreign aid as a strategic tool for gaining increased influence’ (Hatakeyama 2008:345). 
Therefore the dominance of modernization throughout the 1960s and 1970s in international 
aid diplomacy could be seen as having a direct benefit on Japanese interests, especially 
regarding economic opportunities and influence in other parts of Asia.  
However, as the 1970s drew to a close the relevance of the theories underpinning 
development studies began to be called into question and ‘whether it concerned 
modernization theories or neo-Marxist dependency theories, both sets of development 
theories were losing out in terms of their explanatory power’ (Schuurman 2002:12). Thus, 
from the mid 1980s many scholars began to declare an impasse in development studies. In the 
years to follow the failure of real development experienced by many countries, as well as the 
end of the cold war and the inexorable rise of both globalization and post-modernism, were 
used by many scholars to argue that development discourse must change in order to come out 
of this impasse and provide effective and achievable development strategies in the post-
modern world. Moreover, ‘it had become clear to the more insightful thinkers in both the 
North and the South that the problems of the Third World could not be resolved simply by 
mimicking the solutions that had been tried in the North’ (Coronel & Dixit 2006:19). In 
response to Japan, this argument directly opposed the concept of the flying geese model, as 
not only was the trickle-down effect shown to be marginal in real terms but that the trajectory 
of Japan’s own economic development was inapplicable to other developing countries. The 
impasse therefore questioned the relevance and effectiveness of aid policies of the 1960s and 
1970s and as Schuurman (2000) has argued: ‘the challenge for development studies is to re-
establish its continued relevance to study and to understand processes of exclusion, 
emancipation and development’ (2000:19). 
  
This impasse in development studies would go on to have a profound impact on the 
objectives of aid strategies and is often attributed as causing a shift in the focus of global aid 
providers, such as the World Bank who moved from promoting structural adjustment policies, 
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which emphasized the ideals of modernization theory, to more poverty reducing strategies. 
By the late 1990s, the international community had begun to emphasize the need for 
coordination from donors and increased ownership from recipients as fundamental 
ingredients for future aid policies. These ideas were enshrined by the Millennium 
Development Goals which have attempted to ensure that poverty reduction and social 
development remains central to international development agendas. However, for Japan ‘a 
strategy emphasising social development as the key to poverty eradication stood in conflict 
with the underlying rationale behind Japanese assistance’ and a ‘multilateral approach would 
provide the Japanese government with even less of an opportunity to exert any type of 
meaningful influence on the subsequent outcomes’ (Hatakeyama 2008:347-8). Therefore, 
Japan was adamant that it should attempt to challenge the new consensus within the 
international aid debate and establish a more open approach to poverty reduction that 
included more than just the social sector. It also rejected the idea that its own economic 
development experience, where infrastructure development and human resources were 
integral, could not be emulated in other parts of Asia. In essence the ‘Japanese government 
explicitly intended to persuade the international aid community that the East Asian economic 
development approach was effective’ (Hatakeyama 2008: 349). Although this approach was 
not adopted by global financial institutions such as the World Bank or IMF, it has certainly 
shaped Japanese aid policy in the 21st century and its impacts have been felt within the GMS 
programme. This Japanese rhetoric has been mirrored by the Asian Development Bank, 
which has also championed infrastructure as central to the development of the region. This in 
turn has led to criticism of the bank as some have highlighted the ‘shortcomings inherent 
within the developmental vision underpinning the GMS program and questioned its ability to 
deliver poverty reduction on a meaningful and sustained basis’ (Oehlers 2006:466). In fact 
many scholars have attempted to highlight the influence of Japanese interests over the ADB 
in terms of aid allocation, policies and leadership (Kilby 2006, Alesina & Dollar 2000, Wan 
1995), leading some to conclude that Japan and the ADB cannot be considered as mutually 
exclusive. It has been stated that the ‘close connection between the ADB and the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance has not only offered the Japanese officials dealing with the ADB options 
for influencing the bank policies from behind the scenes but also made them identify with the 
ADB’ (Wan 1995:509). It is not the aim of this research to investigate this relationship in 
detail, but rather to use these assumptions as the basis to explain Japan’s role within the GMS. 
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CHAPTER 5 – Quantitative Analysis 
One of the key advantages of the GMS over other regional institutions in South East 
Asia is its ability to secure funding for its integration projects. In assessing the role of Japan 
in the GMS, the countries and sectors of integration that Japan is financing, as well as how its 
foreign aid and trade has changed in the GMS since its establishment, are a good starting 
point for understanding this relationship. Even though the GMS is technically an ADB 
initiative, the sphere of influence and financial contributions made by Japan to the bank have 
meant that many regard the ADB as a mere extension of Japanese foreign policy (Kilby 2006, 
Alesina & Dollar 2000, Wan 1995). Indeed, the Japanese government is the largest 
development partner for the ADB, providing over $8.5 billion in loans, grants and technical 
assistance for development projects across Asia (ADB 2011). In addition to external funding 
from Japan, through loans and grants, a significant part of the ADB funds for projects, 
especially with respect to technical assistance, comes from the Japan Special Fund (JSF). 
Since its inception in 1988, the JSF has placed ‘particular emphasis on industrialization, 
natural resource development, human resource development, and technology transfer’ as well 
as supporting regional cooperation and integration across Asia (ADB 2009). Within the GMS 
framework, the JSF has provided around $50 million in technical assistance grants to member 
countries, with just under half of that being focussed on the transport sector. The graph below 
shows the composition of JSF funding within the GMS by sectors. 
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Figure 5.1 – Japan Special Fund in the GMS by sector 
  
Data Source: ADB-Assisted GMS Technical Assistance Projects, by Sector (2010) 
 
The graph appears to confirm the overwhelming priority infrastructure, and especially 
transportation infrastructure, has in Japanese funded integration projects. However, countries 
in the region also receive funds from the JSF, outside the GMS framework of regional 
integration, which tend to deal with more pro-poor, poverty reduction projects. Since 1992, 
Vietnam has received the largest share of JSF funding with the GMS, receiving almost 
double the funds compared to Lao PDR and Cambodia, and over four times as much as 
Thailand.  
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Figure 5.2 – Cumulative amount of Japan Special Fund Technical Assistance grants received 
between 1992-2009 (in $US ’000) 
 
 
Data Source: ADB (2009) 
 
The difference between JSF received within and outside of the GMS framework, 
reflects the difficulties in assessing Japan’s financial role in the region, as it is difficult to 
separate which funds are used for which projects, as well as the extent to which Japanese 
funding outside of the GMS framework can contribute to integration objectives. Perhaps a 
more comprehensive indicator of Japan’s financial role with regard to the GMS would be to 
consider the bilateral ODA flows between Japan and each GMS member. The following two 
graphs highlight the change in Japanese ODA flows and the share of ODA between four 
GMS members since 1992. As can be seen, the significant decrease in ODA to Thailand has 
been met by a substantial increase in ODA to Vietnam, whilst Cambodia and Lao PDR have 
remained on relatively similar levels of ODA throughout the period.  
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Figure 5.3 – Total ODA gross disbursements from Japan ($US millions) 
 
Data Source: OECD (2011) 
Figure 5.4 – Share of ODA received from Japan  
 
Data Source: OECD (2011) 
This disproportionate allocation of ODA flows may be explained by the differences in 
population between each of the GMS countries, as even though Thailand and Vietnam are 
relatively more developed in respect to GDP and their HDI rankings, they also have far larger 
populations than Lao PDR and Cambodia. The graph below shows the differences in 
population between these four countries. 
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Figure 5.5 – Total Population (Millions) 
  1992  1995  1998  2001  2005  2009 
Cambodia  10.38  11.38  12.25  12.99  13.87  14.81 
Lao PDR  4.44  4.81  5.18  5.5  5.88  6.32 
Thailand   58.19  60.14  61.4  62.99  65.95  67.76 
Vietnam  68.99  72.98  76.52  78.69  83.11  87.28 
  
Data source: World Bank (2011) 
In this respect, ODA per capita may be more useful in examining aid flows between 
Japan and the GMS economies, as it should give a more balanced representation of how 
much aid each country is receiving. 
 
Figure 5.6 Total ODA per capita from Japan ($US) 
 
Data Source: OECD (2011)/World Bank (2011) 
As the graph above shows, the ODA per capita received by each of these countries 
has been more varied over time with Lao PDR and Thailand receiving the highest amount of 
ODA per capita throughout the 1990s, and Vietnam gradually rising over time. Nevertheless, 
when this is compared to ODA per capita from other donor countries it still shows that 
Japanese aid does not tend to follow international trends in ODA. To emphasize this point, 
small donor countries, such as Scandinavian countries, are often used as a proxy to highlight 
26 
 
the need and perceived effectiveness of ODA. This is because these countries are often cited 
as fair donors, due to the lack of colonial ties and their humanitarian intentions (Fleck & 
Kilby 2006:214). The graph below shows ODA per capita to the GMS countries from a 
composite of small donors, namely Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands.  
Figure 5.7 – Small Donor ODA per capita ($US) 
 
Data Source: OECD (2011)/World Bank (2011) 
From this graph a clearer distinction can be made between each country, with Lao PDR and 
Cambodia receiving more aid per capita than Thailand and Vietnam, which would seem to 
match neo-liberal ideas which suggest there should be a negative correlation between income 
level and ODA. 
Up until now, the analysis has only dealt with trends in ODA between Japan and the 
GMS, but in order to understand some of the factors behind these trends, other economic ties 
should be considered. Foreign trade flows represent a good indicator for the bilateral 
economic relationship between donor and recipient. The relationship between trade flows and 
aid can be twofold, whereby aid can facilitate trade, either directly through aid tied to imports 
or indirectly through economic growth, which in turn leads to a rise in the demand for 
imports (Osei 2004:356). Alternatively, trade can also be seen to determine aid, whereby 
countries with large volumes of trade flows are seen as strategically and economically 
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important, therefore necessitating a greater share of ODA. Either way, imports and exports 
between a donor and recipient can often be regarded as reflecting both economic and security 
interests of donor countries. In addition to its usefulness as an indicator for the bilateral 
economic ties between two countries, trade can also be used as a significant indicator for 
regional integration. The figure below highlights the changes in intra-GMS trade between 
each of the countries since its establishment. 
Figure 5.8 - Intraregional trade: a growing share of GMS trade 
 
Source AusAID (2010) 
The vast increases in trade between each of the countries may suggest that the infrastructure 
projects undertaken by the GMS could be seen to be relatively successful in their objectives 
to further regional integration, if intra-regional trade is a good indicator. Nevertheless, Japan 
remains a significant trade partner for most GMS economies and in order to understand its 
role in the region, trade flows, and there relationship with ODA, between Japan and the GMS 
must be explored. 
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Figure 5.9 – Total Exports from Japan ($US millions) 
 
Data Source: UNCOMTRADE (2011) 
Figure 5.10 – Total Imports to Japan ($US millions) 
 
Data Source: UNCOMTRADE (2011) 
The graphs above highlight the volume of imports and exports between Japan and four of the 
GMS economies. As the data above shows, the vast majority of trade is with Thailand, which 
has continually had the highest volume of both Japanese exports and imports. Vietnam’s 
trade volumes with Japan have gradually risen since the establishment of the GMS, whereas 
Cambodia and Lao PDR have remained on relatively low levels of trade for both imports and 
exports. Again, similarly to ODA flows, this raw data on trade volumes does not account for 
the differences between these countries, especially with respect to GDP. If this trade data is 
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weighted against the GDP of each respective country the significance of Vietnam as a trade 
partner becomes apparent. In addition to this, these graphs also highlight the importance of 
Japan as a significant trading partner for both Vietnam and Thailand, considering both 
Japanese exports and imports make up roughly between 8-10% of GDP for each country.  
Figure 5.11 – Ratio of Exports from Japan to GDP 
 
Data Source: UNCOMTRADE (2011)/IMF World Economic Outlook (2011) 
Figure 5.12 – Ratio of Imports to Japan to GDP 
 
Data Source: UNCOMTRADE (2011)/IMF World Economic Outlook (2011) 
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Therefore by examining ODA and trade flows between Japan and four of the GMS 
countries it appears that Vietnam and Thailand have been far more significant recipients than 
Cambodia and Lao PDR, and that since 1992 ODA and trade volumes have gradually 
increased for Vietnam whereas although trade has increased for Thailand, ODA has began to 
decrease. This relationship between aid and trade can be explored further by examining 
whether any significant correlations exist between each of these variables. The correlation 
figures between ODA, imports and exports with Japan and the GMS suggests there is a small 
positive significance between aid and trade as the Pearson correlation figure is around 0.490 
and 0.448 for Japanese imports and exports respectively.  
 
Figure 5.13 – Correlation matrix for the GMS 
 Total Exports 
from Japan to 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total Japan 
Imports from 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total ODA 
received from 
Japan $US 
Millions 
(OECD) 
Pearson Correlation 1 .987** .448** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 
Total Exports from Japan to 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 76 76 76 
Pearson Correlation .987** 1 .490** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 
Total Japan Imports from 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 76 76 76 
Pearson Correlation .448** .490** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
Total ODA received from 
Japan $US Millions 
(OECD) N 76 76 76 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
However, if the correlations are run separately for each country, then distinct patterns emerge 
suggesting a skew in interests between Japan and each of the GMS economies. 
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Figure 5.14 – Correlation matrix for Cambodia 
 Total Exports 
from Japan to 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total Japan 
Imports from 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total ODA 
received from 
Japan $US 
Millions (OECD) 
Pearson Correlation 1 .347 -.073 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .146 .767 
Total Exports from Japan to 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 19 19 19 
Pearson Correlation .347 1 .581** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .146  .009 
Total Japan Imports from 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 19 19 19 
Pearson Correlation -.073 .581** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .767 .009  
Total ODA received from 
Japan $US Millions (OECD) 
N 19 19 19 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Figure 5.15 – Correlation matrix for Lao PDR 
 Total Exports 
from Japan to 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total Japan 
Imports from 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total ODA 
received from 
Japan $US 
Millions (OECD) 
Pearson Correlation 1 .655** .082 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .002 .737 
Total Exports from Japan to 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 19 19 19 
Pearson Correlation .655** 1 .267 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002  .269 
Total Japan Imports from 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 19 19 19 
Pearson Correlation .082 .267 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .737 .269  
Total ODA received from 
Japan $US Millions (OECD) 
N 19 19 19 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Figure 5.16 – Correlation matrix for Thailand 
 Total Exports 
from Japan to 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total Japan 
Imports from 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total ODA 
received from 
Japan $US 
Millions (OECD) 
Pearson Correlation 1 .937** -.664** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .002 
Total Exports from Japan to 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 19 19 19 
Pearson Correlation .937** 1 -.672** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .002 
Total Japan Imports from 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 19 19 19 
Pearson Correlation -.664** -.672** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .002  
Total ODA received from 
Japan $US Millions (OECD) 
N 19 19 19 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Figure 5.17 – Correlation matrix for Vietnam 
 Total Exports 
from Japan to 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total Japan 
Imports from 
Country $US 
Millions 
(UNCOMTRAD
E) 
Total ODA 
received from 
Japan $US 
Millions (OECD) 
Pearson Correlation 1 .992** .769** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 
Total Exports from Japan to 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 19 19 19 
Pearson Correlation .992** 1 .796** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 
Total Japan Imports from 
Country $US Millions 
(UNCOMTRADE) N 19 19 19 
Pearson Correlation .769** .796** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
Total ODA received from 
Japan $US Millions (OECD) 
N 19 19 19 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
As the correlation matrices above suggest, there is a significant positive correlation between 
ODA and trade flows with Vietnam and a significant negative correlation between ODA and 
trade flows with Thailand. There are no significant correlations between aid and trade for Lao 
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PDR and only a small positive significant correlation between imports and ODA in 
Cambodia, which may suggest why the correlation for the GMS as a whole is relatively small. 
Therefore, by doing separate correlations for each of the GMS countries, it appears that the 
positive correlation between Japan’s ODA and trade flows in Vietnam, may suggest that 
Japanese ODA has been used to facilitate the increase in trade, which would seem to confirm 
Osei’s (2004) theory on aid facilitating trade. The positive correlation for both imports and 
exports would also seem to fit with the research conducted by Johansson & Pettersson (2009). 
The high levels of both ODA and trade in Vietnam, would at least suggest that Japan has 
specific vested interests in Vietnam, over some of the other GMS economies. The next 
section will explore these interests in greater detail.   
Chapter 6 - Qualitative Analysis 
Commercial Interests 
In understanding the motivations and interests shaping Japan’s role in the Vietnamese 
economy, through its bilateral ODA and projects within the GMS, it is first important to 
understand and highlight the commercial interests involved between both countries. Within 
this research commercial interests will be taken to mean the economic advantages for the 
Japanese government and Japanese Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), related to cost-
effective and value-added production. The interaction of interests between the private sector 
and the Japanese government have been integral in shaping Japanese foreign policy, aid 
allocation and subsequently the projects undertaken by the GMS. Japanese ODA is seen as a 
tool for creating a favourable investment environment for Japanese companies3. The 
assumption that Japanese ODA is used to further these commercial interests appears to match 
the neo-realist theories on foreign aid allocation, whereby states attempt to maximise their 
power and improve their hegemonic status within an anarchic international system 
(Mearsheimer 2001). Therefore any benefits for recipient countries, either through 
technology transfers, increased regional integration or economic development would be 
regarded as by-products of Japanese interests being secured. Some scholars have even argued 
that ‘Japan’s aid policy is simply a continuation of her domestic post-war economic recovery 
strategy; that is, concern for her domestic prosperity and security (Cooray & Shahiduzzaman 
2004:2). However, for the purposes of this research, a more moderate formulation of neo-
realist ideas will be used, suggesting that Japan assigns a clear priority to its national interests, 
                                                
3 Interview with a representative from the Vietnam Development Forum 
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either commercial or geopolitical, in its aid allocation but that developmental and 
humanitarian interests are also significant factors. Nevertheless, commercial interests and the 
assumption that ODA is used to facilitate investment and influenced by profit-maximising 
Japanese MNEs are still fundamental components of its foreign policy and they require a 
deeper analysis in order to understand ODA projects within the GMS framework. 
One way in which this assumption about Japanese ODA allocation can be analysed 
further is to look at the relationship between ODA and FDI within the region and the factors 
that are underpinning this FDI. If ODA is simply used to facilitate Japanese investment, then 
factors affecting Japanese investment may hold some explanations on the surge in ODA to 
Vietnam in the last decade.  
Figure 6.1 - FDI Inflows into GMS Countries by Source Country, 2000-2008 
 
Source: Menon & Melendez (2011) 
The figure above highlights the origins of FDI within the GMS economies between 2000 and 
2008. It shows that across the region, Japan represents the largest percentage of FDI inflows 
from a single country, accounting for over 20% of all FDI within the GMS. The country 
receiving the largest amount of FDI from Japan is Thailand, which fits with the premise that 
ODA is used to facilitate FDI, considering the large amounts of ODA Thailand received from 
Japan during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to this, ‘foreign investors have been attracted 
by Thailand’s relatively strong manufacturing sector, along with its status as the second 
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largest domestic market in the region (18% of total ASEAN GDP in 2009) with 67 million 
consumers’ (Thomsen et al 2011: 33). Although the percentage of Japanese FDI in Vietnam 
is much lower than the Thai figure, it represents the country with second largest percentage of 
Japanese FDI for this period, and is significantly greater than the other three GMS members. 
However, in keeping with Japan’s policy of risk diversification in its FDI, which has 
benefitted many South East Asian countries in the past vis-à-vis China, the last few years 
have seen Japanese companies relocate from Thailand to Vietnam. The political turmoil in 
Thailand over recent years, as well as shocks to its economy during both the Asian and 
Global financial crises, of 1997 and 2008 respectively, has meant that ‘Thailand’s national 
attractiveness, seen in a regional context is being questioned as some neighbouring countries 
such as Vietnam continue to sharpen their competitive edge’ (Hoyrup & Simon 2010:40). 
From the graph below, it shows that in terms of total FDI net inflows, Vietnam has now 
overtaken Thailand, which may suggest that Japanese ODA received in the last decade is 
starting to pave the way for increased investment.    
Figure 6.2 Total FDI inflows into Vietnam and Thailand, 1992-2010 
 
Data Source: IMF (2012) 
Currently, Japan is the fourth largest investor in Vietnam and in the first two months of this 
year alone, of the $1.2 billion of FDI inflows into the country, 80% came from Japanese 
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investors (Vietnam News 29/02/2012). The majority of Japanese investment is within the 
manufacturing sector with large MNEs such as Toyota, Honda, Canon and Sumitomo adding 
to the vast international production networks that Japanese companies have created across 
South East Asia. However, a closer inspection of this increase in Japanese FDI into Vietnam 
reveals that there is an uneven distribution of FDI geographically with the majority of 
investment being directed to specific areas of Vietnam. 
Figure 6.3 – Japan’s FDI location by region, Vietnam 
 
Source: Ha Thi Hong Van (2010) 
The figure above shows the destinations of Japanese FDI within Vietnam, with the top three 
areas being the Central, Red River Delta and East Southern areas, which make up around 
98% of all Japanese FDI into the country. If this is then compared to the map of ongoing 
ODA projects from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), it shows that these 
same areas are where the majority of Japanese ODA projects are being directed. 
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Figure 6.4 – Location Map of JICA’s On-going Projects in Vietnam 
 
Source: JICA (2008) 
If Japanese ODA were to follow neo-liberal assumptions, targeting poverty reduction, then 
ODA would be directed towards less developed areas of Vietnam such as the Central 
Highland, Northern Mountain and Mekong Delta areas. Instead the areas in which ODA is 
directed appears to correlate to areas with high Japanese FDI, and therefore affirms the ideas 
that Japanese ODA is simply a tool for creating a more favourable investment environment 
for Japanese companies. When we consider this within the context of the GMS, it appears 
that the economic corridors and transnational infrastructure projects financed by Japan in the 
region are linking up these areas of high investment to other economic hubs in the region, 
such as Bangkok, rather than creating infrastructure that integrates the rural areas to the urban 
areas. Ishida (2007) argues that the section of the East-West economic corridor being 
focussed on the most is the 406km stretch between Kuchi Narai, Thailand and Dong Ha, 
Vietnam as this forms an integral part of the route between Bangkok and Hanoi, even though 
it only accounts for 27.9% of the corridor (2007:4). 
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 Therefore, there appears to be a significant link between Japanese ODA and FDI in 
Vietnam, which would suggest that commercial interests have a role to play in Japanese aid 
allocation and its interests in promoting regional integration in the GMS. However, this does 
not fully explain the differences in ODA disbursements across the region, and more 
specifically why Vietnam has become a major recipient of Japanese funds, with respect to 
commercial interests. A good starting point to analyse the increased commercial interests of 
Japan in Vietnam, could be the role of labour costs as this is often cited as a core explanation 
for Japanese investment preferences in South East Asia. Ravenhill (1998) argues that due to 
increases in the cost of labour, land and other factors of production, coupled with the 
currency appreciations from the 1985 Plaza Accord, prompted Japanese companies ‘to 
relocate some aspects of their manufacturing in lower cost countries and to change patterns of 
trade’ ( Barker & Goto 1998:262). The table below shows the differing wage levels across 
Asian countries which receive substantial Japanese investment. 
Figure 6.5 – Wage Overheads in Emerging Asia 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2010 
From the table it is clear that Vietnam offers one of the lowest labour costs for investors, 
especially in comparison to its major competitors such as Thailand and China. It has allowed 
them to gain FDI which previously was directed towards Thailand as ‘the Japan External 
Trade Organization (JETRO) reported in December 2007 that Japanese companies are 
relocating production bases to Vietnam to take advantage of lower operating costs and to 
avoid political turmoil’ (Nidhiprabha 2009:184). China is also facing similar issues as 
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‘Japanese firms are moving out of China, where labour costs have increased sharply and the 
Yuan has risen in recent years, to other countries, including Vietnam, where production costs 
are lower’, therefore allowing Vietnam to benefit from Japan’s risk diversification ‘China 
plus one’ policy (Thanh Nien News 09/03/2012). In addition to this, JETRO provide regular 
surveys on Japanese business interests in Asia which also highlight Vietnam’s relatively good 
position with low operational costs regarding oil prices, taxation and transportation costs 
(JETRO 2011). Although cheap labour and other operational costs are often given as a 
general explanation for Japanese investment opportunities, Vietnam is by no means the 
cheapest destination to produce within the GMS, with Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar all 
offering lower labour costs, and some more developed cities such as Bangkok and Kuala 
Lumpur offering cheaper rent and lower social security burdens than Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh or 
Danang (JETRO 2011). Therefore, labour costs alone cannot fully explain the prioritisation 
of Japanese ODA and investment flows into Vietnam, although are certainly considered a 
significant factor in creating an attractive destination for investment4 
Another commonly cited factor in Japanese investment allocation is its status as a 
resource poor country, and that ODA, and subsequently FDI, is often allocated to countries 
which have large supplies of natural resources to offer. This account would certainly fit with 
neo-realist explanations of aid allocation, whereby Japanese activity within the GMS could 
be seen to stem from its desire to secure natural resources. This is reflected in the post Second 
World War aid policies of Japan, which regarded South East Asia as an important supplier of 
natural resources, and is often used today to explain Chinese economic activities in Africa. 
Other South East Asian countries, such as Indonesia, which have received large amounts of 
ODA from Japan over the last 50 years, are often used as an example of this relationship. Not 
only is Indonesia rich in natural resources such as palm oil, timber and natural gas but it also 
the straits of Malacca and Lombok are essential shipping routes for Japanese imports of 
Middle Eastern oil (Trinidad 2007:115). However, if we examine this proposition for the case 
of Vietnam, the need to secure natural resources appears less significant. Although Vietnam 
is among one of the world’s largest producers of primary commodities such as coffee, rice, 
tea and rubber, agriculture as a percentage of GDP has steadily decreased over the last two 
decades and the majority of Vietnamese exports are manufacturing products, which made up 
67.7% of total exports in 2010 (CIEM 2010:26). From the table below it can be seen via the 
composition of Vietnamese exports to Japan that a large proportion are primary products such 
                                                
4 Interview with a representative from the Vietnam Development Forum 
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as crude oil, seafood and wood products. The Nghi Son Refining Project set up in 2009 in the 
central province of Thanh Hoa under a joint venture among Petroleum Vietnam Corp., 
Kuwait Petroleum Corp., Idemitsu Kosan Co. and Mitsui Chemicals Co. is a good example of 
a Japanese funded project which is benefitting from the procurement of natural resources in 
Vietnam (Ha Thi Hong Van 2010:257). 
Figure 6.6 – Major Export Goods from Vietnam to Japan ($US) 
     
Source: Ha Thi Hong Van (2010) 
Nevertheless, the majority of Japanese FDI in Vietnam is within the manufacturing sector and 
a large proportion of exports back to Japan are made up of value-added products such as 
garment products or supply chain components such as electric wires, cables and computer 
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parts. According to recent JETRO surveys, contrary to Vietnam offering a large supply of 
natural resources, a frequent concern of Japanese companies based in the country is the 
procurement of raw materials and lack of domestic supporting industries. In addition to this 
Vietnam is one of the few host countries for Japanese companies in Asia where the majority 
of raw materials and parts procured for manufacturing are imported from Japan rather than 
sourced domestically (JETRO 2011:37). These difficulties faced by Japanese companies 
highlight the importance of improved transnational infrastructure to other parts of South East 
Asia, where raw materials can be procured more easily and industries in Vietnam can be 
linked up to supporting industries throughout the GMS.  
Finally, when examining Japanese commercial interests in Vietnam within a regional 
context, one must also consider the geographical advantages of Vietnam over some of its 
neighbours. The significant link between the areas in which both FDI and ODA are being 
directed would suggest that geographical considerations are also an important factor in 
Japan’s increased investment in Vietnam. As well as being the closest GMS member 
geographically to Japan, Vietnam can also be considered a gateway to both China and the 
remaining members of the GMS and beyond through the development of the economic 
corridors. Perhaps the most significant, and arguably the most advanced, economic corridor 
within the GMS is the East West Economic Corridor (EWEC) which links the international 
port of Danang, Vietnam through Lao PDR and Thailand to the Dawei seaport in Myanmar. 
This effectively bisects the region, creating a transportation link between the Indian Ocean 
and the South China Sea. Therefore for Japanese companies, Vietnam represents the 
geographical entry point of this economic corridor. The Japanese government has placed 
primary priority on the EWEC through ODA projects under the GMS and the economic 
corridor is now often mentioned in daily newspapers in Japan as several logistics companies 
have discovered the burgeoning business opportunities available for investment in this region 
(Ishida 2007:3). The commercial benefits for Japanese companies in developing the EWEC 
can be seen in the potential reduction of transportation costs as well as providing the shortest 
land route between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean. This is significant in that Japanese oil 
imports from the Middle East would only take 3 days to travel by land from Myanmar to 
Vietnam, rather than the 10 day journey by sea, passing through the Malacca straits which 
have experienced numerous problems with piracy and are expensive to police (Charoensri 
2010:7). In this respect the EWEC can be seen as both time and cost effective for Japanese 
commercial interests. 
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Developmental interests 
The neo-realist explanations of Japanese aid allocation, whereby ODA is used 
primarily as a tool to create a favourable investment environment for Japanese companies, 
certainly goes some way to explain its prominence in Vietnam and emphasis on transnational 
infrastructure projects.  However, it is also important to consider the developmental interests 
with this relationship, as the objectives of the GMS may also be considered as 
complementary to ASEAN’s objective to close the development gap between mainland and 
archipelago South East Asia by 2015, under its ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
project. In keeping with more neo-liberal ideas, it is often argued that the aim to make ‘aid 
more effective is at the core of all development assistance’ and that donors and recipients 
must ‘coordinate to align with every country’s specific priorities, as well as with the 
development goals’ (Nallari & Griffith 2011:133). In this respect, recipient countries which 
are considered effective in their aid management are often seen as more favourable countries 
to invest in. Vietnam is popular among multilateral and bilateral donors as it is perceived as 
an ‘effective’ user of aid and has subsequently become the world’s third largest aid recipient 
(Forsberg 2008:191). Since the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, 
there have been many international initiatives that have aimed to outline what it means to be 
an aid effective country as a guideline for both donors and recipients. The Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 set out five principles by which progress in aid management 
would be assessed; ownership of aid projects in the recipient country, alignment of aid 
projects to national development strategies, harmonization of donor actions, managing 
resources for development results and the mutual accountability of both donors and recipients 
(Nallari & Griffith 2011:158).  
In respect to aid effectiveness, one of the key turning points in Vietnam’s economic 
transition, which is often cited as an important factor in the increase in Japanese ODA to the 
country, is the change in its status from a lower to middle income economy in 20095. 
Although on the surface this may appear to be contradictory to traditional developmental 
interests, whereby economies with higher incomes should receive less foreign aid, the 
transition in income status has meant a shift in the type of ODA from grants to loans or 
partnership based funding. Within Vietnam the management of ODA grants is perceived as 
ineffective as procedures and monitoring of the grant differ depending on the donor and 
                                                
5 Interviews with representatives from IPSARD and CIEM  
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triangulation of costs involved are not required, therefore creating high corruption and low 
accountability6. Therefore, in the case of Japan, grant based ODA may be perceived as high 
risk, ineffective and will produce low economic returns for both Vietnam and Japan. 
However, with loan based ODA in Vietnam, there is a greater harmonization of the 
management system, whereby all ODA collectively has to follow domestic regulations which 
have a stricter monitoring system, external financial auditing, higher transparency and greater 
accountability7. This can therefore be seen to fit with the principles outlined at the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, as it allows for greater ownership, management and 
accountability of aid received by Vietnam. The higher interest rates associated with loan 
based ODA also increase ownership of the aid from Vietnam as there is an added importance 
to use their aid effectively if they are paying for it. Japan also stands to benefit as it is a 
profitable and safe investment, ‘with an interest rate of more than 1.8 per cent […] the debts 
which Vietnam has to pay in the future years are not small, and this is to the direct benefit of 
Japan’ (Dung 2007:164). 
Figure 6.7 – Composition of Japanese ODA to Vietnam, 1992-2010 
 
Data Source: OECD (2012) 
                                                
6 Interview with representative from IPSARD 
7 ibid 
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The graph above shows how the composition of Japanese ODA to Vietnam, between 
grants and loans, has changed since the establishment of the GMS. Although it may be too 
early to assess fully the impact of the change in status to a middle income economy on 
Japanese ODA, it appears that grant based aid has been steadily falling since the GMS began 
in 1992. This may also be interpreted as a result of increasingly efficient aid management by 
Vietnam and an increase in the proportion of loan based ODA should have a beneficial 
impact on the country’s development. However, the lower risks associated with the 
management of loan-based ODA are not always the case, as a high profile case of corruption 
caused Japan to momentarily freeze all loan-based ODA to Vietnam in December 2008. Four 
officials from a Japanese based consultancy firm were arrested and indicted on a charge of 
bribing foreign public servants in return for consultancy contracts on the East-West Highway 
Project in Ho Chi Minh City (MOFA 2009). 
Through the numerous GMS projects and bilateral ODA funded by Japan in Vietnam 
the strong emphasis on the development of infrastructure as the key to improving prosperity, 
as well as improving regional integration in Vietnam, appears to encapsulate more general 
developmental interests, as well as the commercial interests previously outlined. Regarding 
transport infrastructure, Japan’s investments can be seen to fit into the modernization 
development paradigm, whereby improved transport infrastructure reduces transport costs in 
the host countries, creating a favourable environment for trade and FDI, which in turn can be 
considered the engine for economic growth. Therefore, emphasizing transport infrastructure’s 
importance in development can be seen as a strategic way of promoting economic growth. It 
has also been noted that ‘there are vast differences between countries and also between 
regions within countries with respect to availability of transport provision and levels of 
development’ (Hilling 2002:80).  On this basis, Japan has emphasized the importance of 
transport infrastructure in development through its promotion of the EWEC and other 
economic corridors. Since the establishment of these economic corridors in the GMS, many 
scholars (Edmonds & Fujimura 2008, Strutt & Lim 2005, Bafoil & Lin 2010) have 
emphasized their success in providing development, based on the significance of trade in 
generating economic growth. Edmonds & Fujimura’s (2008) study into the role of cross-
border infrastructure in the regional integration of the GMS states that ‘infrastructure in the 
GMS has had a discernible positive effect on regional trade’ (2008:169). From this 
perspective it can be deduced that infrastructural projects in the GMS, which Japan is a 
significant financer of, are essential elements to its success in progressing regional integration. 
45 
 
It has also been stated that ‘international trade and associated policy reform should be a key 
area of focus for those interested in alleviating poverty and achieving sustainable 
development in the GMS’ (Strutt & Lim 2005:17). 
However, as with most development strategies underpinned by modernization theory, 
their disadvantages tend to come from the unequal distribution of any economic growth 
generated. It is important to note that targeting economic growth, such as Japan’s 
infrastructure projects, fails to take into account that ‘development is a multi-dimensional 
concept which embraces multifarious economic and social objectives’ and that in addition to 
economic growth, ‘the distribution of income, the provision of basic needs and the real and 
psychological well-being of people’ must be included in development strategies (Thirlwall 
2002:44). In comparison to studies promoting these infrastructure projects, very few have 
studied the socio-economic impacts of infrastructural development within the GMS and 
subsequently the shortcomings of aid policies that are underpinned by modernization theory. 
Stone et al. (2009) has attempted to analyse some of the impacts and notes that these large 
infrastructure projects tend to have a greater positive effect on urban households and skilled 
wages, rather than rural households and unskilled wages. In this respect a more structural 
approach to poverty can be adopted, whereby large infrastructure projects do little to change 
the marginality of rural, unskilled labour within an economy. This appears to fit with the idea 
of marginality as a reflection of ‘a lack of integration into capitalist society’ and would, 
therefore, be reinforced as urban households became richer and further enlarge the difference 
between the core and the periphery (Clarke 2002:93). As well as the issues of inequality and 
unequal distribution, some scholars have also challenged the ideas of integration and 
connectivity as core components of sustainable development, as propagated by Japan. 
Although tourism, investment and employment can have positive social benefits for people 
within the region, other social issues such as human trafficking, prostitution and HIV/AIDS 
have all been cited as increasing problems as a result of improved connectivity through 
transport infrastructure within the GMS region (Fujita & Takahashi 2010:93). 
Moreover, this priority on infrastructural development as an integral component of 
regional integration, and subsequently economic development, is somewhat limited 
considering the specific infrastructure projects financed by Japan. For countries such as 
Vietnam, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Myanmar, a large obstacle for connectivity is the lack of 
domestic integration, through rural infrastructure, which is imperative to providing links to 
markets for the rural areas. In the case of Lao PDR, ‘the benefits of integration with 
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international markets have not been dissipated throughout the Lao economy, as domestic 
market integration remains low’ (Andersson et al 2007:2). When examining infrastructural 
development in Vietnam, a similar problem occurs as even though the GMS has made great 
progress in creating transportation links between major economic hubs in the country, rural 
infrastructure remains relatively under-developed and therefore the extent to which Vietnam  
is becoming integrated into the region is fragmented. If Japan had developmental interests at 
the core of its aid policies, it would be thought that more funding would be provided for rural 
infrastructure in Vietnam, but in reality the majority of financing comes from the national 
government and there is little private sector interest at the rural level8. It appears that without 
the additional commercial interests offered by more national and transnational infrastructure 
projects, there is little interest and subsequently no external funding for rural infrastructure. 
Despite the priority attached to infrastructure by the Vietnamese government through its new 
$400 billion infrastructure plan, there is low alignment between projects on different geo-
spatial levels and, more often than not, national and transnational infrastructure is prioritised 
over rural9. In addition to problems associated with rural integration, linking the periphery 
areas of Vietnam to more commercially affluent areas, obstacles also exist in more 
international forms of integration embedding Vietnam within the global economy. Large 
scale international integration, such as meeting the objectives set by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), requires extensive changes to domestic institutions, fundamental 
market reforms and amendments to existing laws, which will undoubtedly take a considerable 
length of time10. This would suggest that GMS integration promoted by Japan remains a 
relatively isolated form of integration, with little domestic integration underpinning the 
projects in each of the member countries and few objectives aimed at contributing to a more 
comprehensive form of international integration. Therefore, the extent to which the GMS can 
be seen as a building bloc to regional integration is somewhat limited. Alternatively, Japan 
could be seen to be adopting the most viable option of integration for Vietnam by 
spearheading the GMS project. As the most feasible geo-spatial level of integration for the 
member states, the GMS could be seen as incorporating the developmental interests of Japan 
to close the development gap in South East Asia whilst also offering some economic returns 
for Japan. 
 
                                                
8 Interview with representative from VCF 
9 ibid 
10 Interview with representative from CIEM 
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Geopolitical interests 
Until now the interests explored behind Japan and Vietnam’s economic relationship 
have been relatively bilateral and isolated within a regional context. In this final part of the 
analysis, Japan’s interests in promoting integration and aid allocation will be considered 
within a regional context by exploring the rise of China as an economic superpower and its 
significant impact on Japanese foreign policy. The geopolitical interests of Japan within the 
GMS can be analysed from both neo-liberal and neo-realist perspectives, and therefore seem 
to fit with the mixed neo-realist framework of this research. 
Japan’s proactive involvement in promoting the GMS can be seen to fit into a more 
general policy towards South East Asia, which attempts to both accommodate and balance 
China’s increasing prominence in the region (Trinidad & Yoshimatsu 2010:216). The 
interplay between cooperation and competition with China has therefore affected the progress 
of the GMS, compared to other regional integration initiatives, and has also affected the skew 
in aid allocation between Japan and each of the GMS countries. In the case of Vietnam, rather 
than viewing China as an alternative external actor which can help facilitate integration, the 
widespread opinion is that ‘with the increasing Chinese domination of the GMS region, 
Vietnam sees its own autonomy and sovereignty increasingly threatened’ (Wade 2010:9). 
However, this does not seem to be the case with Japan, as they appear to be a more trusted 
economic partner and donor for Vietnam and China’s contribution to Vietnam’s integration 
through aid or investment is viewed as insignificant11. This may also lie in the fact that 
Vietnam tends to view the GMS as a building bloc of regional integration, with increased 
integration into ASEAN as a primary objective. Japan’s desire for increased integration in 
ASEAN, and the formation of an economically strong regional bloc fits with its ideas on 
balancing China’s economic strength in East Asia and would therefore seem to mirror 
Vietnam’s integration objectives. Thailand, as a core member of the original ASEAN-6, is 
also keen to promote these objectives and places a high priority on an integrated South East 
Asia as more important than integration with China. However, this view is not shared across 
the other GMS economies, as Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar have all received large 
amounts of aid and investment from China, leading some to argue that these countries are 
‘already virtual client states of China […], increasingly tied (and in some ways beholden) to 
the economic behemoth to the north’ (Wade 2010:13). In this respect integration between 
                                                
11 Interview with a representative from CIEM 
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GMS countries, and ultimately within ASEAN, may be seen as less significant for these 
countries than integration with China, due to the immediate economic benefits offered, and 
therefore may go some way to explain their relative insignificance in Japanese aid and 
investment allocation compared to Vietnam and Thailand.  
Historically, Japan’s role in East Asian regionalism is often related to its position vis-
à-vis China, with both nations competing to exert influence over their South East Asian 
neighbours. Throughout the Cold War, Japan’s focus was more on establishing pan-Pacific 
linkages with allies such as the US, Australia and New Zealand. However post Cold War, 
changes in the international system which saw the amelioration of global production 
networks and the economic rise of China, shifted Japan’s focus towards promoting its 
relationship with South East Asia, and especially the countries of the GMS. During this time 
Japan played an integral role in the establishment of many regional frameworks, such as East 
Asia Summit (EAS) or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Although these can 
be seen as key developments in the regionalism of East Asia; Japan’s motives in setting up 
these frameworks could be seen as an attempt to counterbalance the power and influence of 
China in the region by the inclusion of powerful allies such as the US, Australia, New 
Zealand and India in regional affairs (Shirashi 2009:26). In the wake of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, Japan also proposed the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund, to help address the needs of 
Asian countries that the IMF could not provide for. However this was opposed, not only by 
China who feared it would enhance Japan’s hegemony in the region, but also by the US who 
believed it would undermine the IMF. Having learnt from its mistakes in its previous 
attempts at furthering East Asian regionalism, the inclusion of the Yunnan and Guangxi 
provinces into the GMS, apart from their geographical position, could be seen to stem from 
the ‘desire of Japanese leaders not to induce the Chinese leaders to view the GMS 
programme as a diplomatic structure potentially against China’s interests’ (Faure & Schwab 
2008:111). Despite differences in objectives for regional integration from both countries this 
tactic of inclusion and participation of China appears to have worked in so far as ‘China 
openly declares that the GMS is the most effective economic mechanism in the region’ 
(Wade 2010:1). The commitment from both China and Japan to promoting the GMS has 
numerous advantages for the regional institution’s progress, as long as integration objectives 
from China and Japan are synchronized and economic returns for both countries are 
considered equal. However, competition may arise, especially considering China’s 
emergence as an aid giver and significant actor within the ADB. In this respect the growing 
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influence China will come to have in the ADB will mean that Japan ‘can no longer consider 
its private domain’ in the bank’s projects and some have argued that ‘this probably marks the 
end of the Nippo-American condominium on the Bank which de facto allowed the Japanese 
partner to run it’ (Faure 2010:183). Therefore, the relationship between China and Japan may 
determine the future of the GMS. 
 
One area in which this interplay between competition and cooperation can be seen in 
the GMS, between China and Japan, is by once again considering the economic corridors. As 
previously stated the Japanese government has placed priority on the development of the 
EWEC, as it provides a strategic gateway between the Indian and Pacific Ocean and will 
provide crucial links between commercial centres with a high proliferation of Japanese 
companies. Conversely the Chinese government is putting more focus on the North South 
Economic Corridor (NSEC), hoping to develop high speed rail and road links between 
Kunming and Bangkok, which from there can be extended further to Malaysia and Singapore. 
Therefore ‘there appears to be a geographic division of tasks between China and Japan which 
will impact their own regional strategies as they compete for leadership in the GMS’ (Taillard 
2010:228). Nevertheless, Japan will still stand to benefit from the development of the NSEC, 
and vice versa with China and the EWEC, and therefore this division of interests may be 
beneficial in creating pragmatic solutions to the infrastructure problems within the GMS. The 
development of an extensive economic corridor between Shanghai and Singapore, which is 
the ultimate goal of the NSEC, would be of great economic benefit for Japan as the area 
would encompass 70.3% of all Japanese companies located in China as well as 76.6% of all 
Japanese companies affiliated in ASEAN (Ishida 2007:4). Like Japan, the commercial 
interests for China involved with the development of these economic corridors are 
innumerable and despite the differences in which of these corridors is the most desirable for 
either Japan or China, the rapid improvement of transportation and infrastructure networks in 
the GMS will bring benefit to both countries. In terms of strategic perspectives, the ‘South-
ward’ strategy whereby China is primarily focussed on the promotion of the NSEC will 
support the interests of Chinese companies and provide a link from land-locked areas of 
Southern China to areas where deep seaports can be constructed in South East Asia12. In this 
respect the promotion of economic corridors may offer an area of cooperation for both 
countries as they both stand to gain from reduced transport costs and increased access to 
                                                
12 Interview with representative from Chulalongkorn University 
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markets. Yoshimatsu (2010) argues that this is indicative of a more general pattern of 
development in the GMS, whereby, ‘Mekong development can be regarded as a locus where 
self-motivated states undertake diplomatic bargains in order to attain specific national 
interests’ (2010:77).     
 
Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
In conclusion, Japan has been a highly significant actor in both the construction and 
promotion of the GMS, through both the provision of ODA and indirectly through its position 
in the ADB. The GMS can be considered as advantageous over the other regional institutions 
for the Mekong economies in two different ways. Firstly, the large amount of resources 
available for projects has meant that real progress can be made in the provision of physical 
infrastructure, which is often the most costly element of regional integration programmes. 
Through the development of transnational economic corridors, the GMS has been able to 
secure funding from external donors, such as Japan, who have a vested interest in improving 
transportation linkages for Japanese supply chains in the region, as well as close the 
development gap between rich and poor areas of South East Asia. The second advantage of 
the GMS is its market-based approach to regionalism, which has allowed for flexibility in 
allocating projects to areas where demand is greatest. The lack of an institutional framework 
in the GMS has meant that political differences between member countries, which are often 
an obstacle for other institutions such as ASEAN, can be bypassed in order to focus 
exclusively on economic integration. Its structure as a ‘top-down’ form of regionalism, 
promoted by an external actor, also means that the interests of one member country are not 
propagated over others, therefore improving its legitimacy amongst all member states. 
Since the establishment of the GMS in 1992, Japan has provided large amounts of 
funding through ODA and the JSF to help facilitate integration projects across the region, 
with the majority of finances being directed towards improving transportation. Historically 
Japan has always had a good economic relationship with Thailand, but as the former socialist 
economies of South East Asia have begun to participate in the global economy, Japan has 
started to diversify its investment locations. The strong positive correlation between aid and 
trade flows in Vietnam, compared to the negative correlation in Thailand, suggests that Japan 
has shifted its focus towards Vietnam with increasing amounts of ODA seeming to have a 
positive effect on trade and investment between the two countries. 
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By examining the economic relationship between Vietnam and Japan, it can be seen 
that Japanese national interests have been a primary factor in its aid allocation, and 
subsequently can be used to explain Japan’s motivations behind constructing and promoting 
the GMS. ODA appears to have been used to create a favourable environment for Japanese 
investment, by funding infrastructure projects which lower transport costs and improve 
access to foreign markets. The increase in ODA to Vietnam, relative to other GMS 
economies, can be seen to be attributed to Vietnam’s low costs of production and its 
geographical location as a gateway to the rest of South East Asia, as well as China. In 
addition to commercial interests, geopolitical rivalry with China can also be seen as a 
contributing factor in Japan’s role within the GMS. The interplay between competition and 
cooperation with the two regional hegemons will undoubtedly shape the progress of the GMS 
in future years. Nevertheless, in understanding Japan’s motivations behind its promotion of 
the GMS, and its increased interests in Vietnam, its developmental interests are also relevant, 
and are more congruent with the international consensus on foreign aid. The provision of 
transnational infrastructure has often been regarded as an integral factor in the high economic 
growth rates experienced across South East Asia in the past few decades, and therefore the 
GMS can be considered as a good example of developmental regionalism. Additionally, 
increased interests in Vietnam could be the result of increasing improvements in Vietnam’s 
aid management and its transition from a lower income to a middle income country. However, 
even though the GMS is targeting developing countries, the areas in which the majority of aid 
is being allocated appears to be the more commercial areas, with many of the infrastructure 
projects focussed on linking these areas to each other. In this respect, the GMS could be 
considered as failing to provide development for the less developed areas in the region. 
Developmental interests appear to have taken a backseat to more commercial and geopolitical 
interests. The experiences of Vietnam can be used to highlight that for other developing 
countries undergoing a transition towards market economy, integration is working at three 
different geo-spatial levels, namely domestic, regional and international. What has become 
apparent in examining the role of Japan in the integration of the GMS is that for top-down 
regionalism it appears that regional-level integration is the most accessible form of 
integration, over domestic or international, as it seems to satisfy the interests of both recipient 
countries and significant donors. 
Although Japan’s aid policy seems to prioritise national interests, either commercially 
or geo-politically, this should not diminish the advantages associated with the GMS, despite 
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contrasting with the international consensus on foreign aid. Japan’s role as an alternative 
donor to the region, compared to European, American or other international institutions, 
means that a diverse range of aid projects are undertaken in the region, which can be 
complementary. Focussing primarily on the provision of transnational public goods, whereas 
other donors have focussed on different factors of integration, means that a more 
comprehensive form of regional integration can be pursued which is more in-keeping with 
New Regionalism Theory. The complementary aspect of donors is mirrored in the way in 
which the GMS can be seen to complement other regional institutions, at different geo-spatial 
levels, such as ASEAN, APEC or the WTO. Therefore, similarly to the role of donors, a 
wider range of regional institutions, focussing on different aspects of integration, can be 
beneficial for all so long as participating countries have the capacity to manage these 
different projects. The GMS is likely to continue advancing regional integration for the 
Mekong economies as long as benefits are realised, Japanese interests are sustained and 
integration is considered desirable for member countries.  
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